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Following up on proposals by several others,' Blair and Kaserman have
thoroughly examined the current system of kidney procurement in The Econom-
ics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies. They
advocate an alternative which, they argue, would lead to a greater yield of
kidneys for transplant. They find that a market system for obtaining consent
for kidney donation would be the best means of alleviating the shortage.
The authors carefully define the boundaries of the issue they are confront-
ing. They speak of kidney donation only from cadavers (non-living donors),
and focus their arguments on the benefits to be derived for end-stage renal
disease (dialysis) patients. They claim that other populations of waiting patients,
also in need of vital organs, would benefit by virtue of a system which will
produce more multiple organ donors.
In this comment, I critique Blair and Kaserman's argument by clarifying
the limits of their theoretical framework, and by trying to shed some light on
the importance of what they leave out-most importantly issues of organ
allocation. To do this, I will attempt to indicate what information is missing,
obtainable, and usable in the final debate over the public policy choice concern-
ing non-living organ donors. I will ask to what extent the shortage is due to
a lack of consent and to what extent it is due to other problems in the altruistic
system. I will try to explain why the current altruistic system developed and
why there might be significant resistance to the market alternative. A consider-
ation of these issues brings me to the conclusion that we need a much better
understanding of the organ donor shortage before we begin the final debate on
the choice of a procurement system.
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1. See Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58
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I. Supply and Demand: A Medical Perspective
Blair and Kaserman support a system change aimed at increasing the
number of donors by using monetary transfer to motivate consent for non-living
organ donation. With such an approach, they argue, more donors will material-
ize, and the cost of buying consent for organ donation will be reasonable as
market forces are called into play. The authors further emphasize the role of
professional hegemony in creating inefficiencies in the current system. Many
of the inefficiencies of the current system appear to be related to factors such
as lack of organization within hospitals and disinterest among professional
parties who should be involved with donor identification. In addition, problems
of the current system may be related to inability or disinterest of non-profes-
sional parties to participate, or to organize themselves to participate in the
system debate, as well as professional hegemony.
It is important to distinguish two aspects of the shortage which are often
confused. The first is the question of how many potential non-living organ
donors, not currently identified as such, could be identified and could provide
organs? The second issue concerns the policy of allocation for organs once
they are obtained.'
In considering the supply of organs, we should first ask: what is the
extent of the organ donor shortage? To answer this question, it is necessary
to understand the process of donor identification. Non-living organ donors must
have had irreversible brain injury such that two neurospecialists, with no
professional conflict of interest in organ donation or transplant recipient benefit,
can unambiguously state that there is no possibility of higher level brain
function recovery. These prospective donors are typically located in hospitals,
are on mechanical ventilation, and are of a neurological status such that if the
respirator is disconnected, inability to breathe leads to immediate cardiac arrest.
The number of patients who are in this neurological state becomes the
important variable in the equation needed to answer the question: how many
potential donors are there? The reason to ask and answer the question is that
Blair and Kaserman imply in their proposal that there would be a relatively
unlimited number of these cases identified under a market system of compen-
sated consent. Such a large number would then likely cause the price to stabi-
lize at a reasonable level, if not end the shortage. This claim about numbers
of donors is unrealistic.
It is a simple matter to determine the variables of the supply equation. They
are the number of respirator-dependent brain-injury deaths that are available
as organ donors, less those where there has been failure to ask for consent,
2. See generally Murray, On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets,
and the Meaning of Strangers, 20 J. L. REFORM 1055, 1076 (1987) (distinguishing markets for production
from markets for allocation).
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failure to follow-up on procedures in donor identification, family refusal for
personal reasons (religious, superstitious, lack of a clear will of the deceased),
family obstruction of a living will (a potentially serious time-consuming
deterrent), or medical unsuitability. It is my belief that as thorough studies to
obtain this type of information are reported, it will emerge that the former
factor, failure to request, will be shown to be the most important reason for not
realizing more donors.3
This important part of the shortage problem may not necessarily be affected
by the type of market system change proposed. Hospitals fail to identify many
potential donors because they lack well-developed procedures and protocols,
often owing to the fact that many facilities rarely encounter brain-death respira-
tor-dependent potential donors. Often, education of pertinent staff has been
ineffective, motivation is lacking, or logistics are a problem. It is these issues
that organ procurement organizations (OPOs) understand, but better need to
focus upon. While it would seem unthinkable to lose organs from a consenting
individual in any system because of lack of motivation and cooperation within
a hospital, there is little evidence to indicate that a market system could do
anything substantial to correct this scenario.
Turning to the issue of demand, the authors' proposal raises potentially
disturbing questions. How would organ value be determined under their system?
Are we now entering the territory of rules of allocation when we speak of
individual donor-recipient transactions? This raises a larger ethical question:
whether a professional should have to consider what an individual recipient is
willing to pay before performing a transplant operation. A system that favored
one recipient over another on the basis of ability to pay would create the
opportunity to manipulate the system for organs of better quality, from younger
donors, better tissue match, and so on. The proposal fails to understand that
there are established genetic and medical criteria which operate to allocate
organs in the interest of long-term success.
Another question is whether, in establishing the worth of an organ by
mechanisms that attempt to measure patient desires, the choice is influenced
by psychological desperation, dissatisfaction with current therapy, the amount
of available wealth, and willingness to part with it. For instance, there are very
different psychological forces at work in a patient on dialysis who can live
normally, as opposed to the end-stage heart patient who will die in a matter of
3. See Nathan, Jarrell, Broznik, Kochik, Hamilton, Stuart, Ackroyd, & Nell, Estimation and Character-
ization of the Potential Renal Organ Donor Pool in Pennsylvania, 51 TRANSPLANTATION 142-149 (1991)
[hereinafter Nathan]; Prottas & Batten, Health Professionals and Hospital Administrators in Organ Procure-
ment: Attitudes, Reservations, and Their Resolutions, 78 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 642-645 (1988); Prottas,
Obtaining replacements: The organizational framework of organ procurement. 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& LAW 235-250 (1983); Robertson, Supply and Distribution of Hearts for Transplantation: Legal, Ethical,
and Policy Issues, 75 CIRCULATION 77-87 (1987).
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months without a transplant. Therefore, market theorists must detail what sorts
of medical and psychosocial determinants will operate in the market system.
If large insurers or government agencies, instead of individuals, are to partici-
pate in a market system, the result may be very different from that predicted
by simple economic models predicated on atomistic competition. While Blair
and Kaserman's market analysis is provocative, a full and reasoned debate over
organ procurement must go beyond basic supply and demand to discuss the
practical policy decisions which are intertwined with the issue of allocation.
II. Misleading Images
Turning to the elements of the supply equation, I will address the mislead-
ing assumptions and imagery informing the Blair and Kaserman article. The
first assumption is that donor organs are routinely wasted because of the failure
of the altruistic system of consent. If we exclude those cases where failure to
obtain consent can be traced to people with strongly held negative beliefs
regarding organ donation (a group unlikely to change their beliefs in any
system), we are left with the focus on those cases where there is an ambivalent
will of the deceased. Blair and Kaserman cite articles suggesting that only a
small percentage (<20%) of potential donors are realized. This figure is based
on a number of estimates and is exaggerated due to a lack of methodology
accurately defining the correct denominator for the ratio, based on respirator
dependency and medical suitability. More recent studies have shown that the
current altruistic system yields about 50-65% of the respirator-dependent
potential donors.4
High quality information is necessary to understand why, though under the
current system the number of kidneys transplanted increased from 4900 in 1981
to 9000 in 1987, the increase has not been sustained. More recent data for 1990
shows 8484 non-living donor kidneys transplanted.' Whether this plateau is
due to a failure or limitation of altruism in the current system is unclear. What
is clear is that the reasons for the difference in potential versus achieved
donations can be determined. The need to obtain accurate information to define
the real nature of the acquisition problem is still required for the final debate
over the merits of the market system.
Adding to the organ shortage imagery is the often repeated allusion to
young highway accident victims as donors. 6 This gives the impression that the
4. See Balk, Etude Sur Les Donneurs D'organes au Qudbec 1-30 (Report to the Minister of Health
of the Province of Quebec, 1991); Nathan, supra note 3. But see Prottas, supra note 3 (finding this figure
to be as low as 9%).
5. Nathan, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Feb. 27, 1991, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 1-51 (arguing that "a market might function tolerably well when
addressed to some discrete segment of the population, groups such as the Hell's Angels, made up of
disaffected, violent young males who care little about their estates."); Hansmann, supra note 1, at 57-85
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majority of highway accident casualties are potentially available for organ
donation when in fact, they are not. While head-injury victims of some motor
vehicle accidents do supply many organs, organs can be procured only from
those who die in hospitals while on respirators. There are many other types of
disease-associated brain injury which lead to suitable organ donor status;
noteworthy are those due to cerebrovascular accidents.
Another type of imagery used is that of the languishing dialysis patient.
Patients doing poorly on dialysis often do poorly when they receive kidney
transplants. In reality, patients with end-stage renal disease have two adequate
choices of therapy: dialysis or renal transplantation. Dialysis is more costly, and
in many situations is quite inconvenient. Some patients have continuing medical
problems and some would prefer to undergo a transplant. In addition, transplant
patients often have medical, psychosocial, and rehabilitation problems which
affect their dependence on the health care system. Graft loss does eventually
occur in many patients. To cite one year graft survival as the outcome measure
of success for transplantation seems a rather weak banner.7 Patients who have
unsuccessful renal transplants usually return to dialysis, as mortality rates are
less than 5% per year, and many of the patients with failed transplants, but not
all, choose to undergo a transplant again. If one corrects patient survival data
for age and co-morbid processes, the technologies of dialysis and transplantation
show no significant difference.' Thus, the preference of most dialysis patients
for transplants is related to their perception of a better "quality of life." They
are usually motivated by their own discontent on dialysis, by exposure to other
transplant patients who have done well, and by information they receive from
medical professionals.
III. Cartel Analysis
The authors frame the issue of therapy for end-stage kidney failure in terms
of the traditionally perceived adversarial relationship of dialysis versus trans-
plantation. The therapists for these two modes of treatment are dialysis physi-
cians and transplant surgeons. Particularly in the U.S., these competing special-
ists have often been players in a fragmented treatment process. They have
argued about the virtues of their own forms of therapy, rarely considering the
(proposing that private firms target "rowdy motorcycle gangs and buy up organ futures from their members
for cash"). The language of such commentary seems rather cynical, and implies that certain segments of
society are seen as providing organs for the benefit of other groups.
7. Blair & Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies,
8 YALE J. ON REG. (1991).
8. Hutchinson, Thomas, Lemieux, & Harvey, Prognostically Controlled Comparison of Dialysis and
Renal Transplantation, 26 KIDNEY INr'L 44-51 (1984).
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more appropriate question of how to maximize the quantity and quality of life
for a patient with end-stage renal failure.9
Patients are caught up by the tensions in this process. There are two gates
through which renal transplant patients must travel. The first is receiving
treatment by dialysis, and the second is placement on a waiting list for a
transplant. In order to be considered for passage through the second gate, a
referral by a dialysis physician has to be made. I would argue that this is a
referral which every patient has the right to demand. It is thus very revealing
to learn that while 110,000 patients are currently on dialysis in the U.S., only
25,000 are on transplant lists. Certainly some of the responsibility for this
discrepancy lies with the unfortunate fragmentation between the dialysis and
transplant professional communities. While the discrepancy may be partially
attributed to patient disinterest or medical unsuitability for transplant, I believe
that it is more significantly due to sequestration of patients by some dialysis
physicians because of professional and financial self-interest.
With respect to the sequestration of patients, the authors have mistakenly
implied conspiratorial behavior among transplant professionals. While this
unfortunate situation can arise in less-integrated professional communities,
ideally there should be very low incentives for sequestration even among
dialysis professionals. Referring patients to transplant physicians should not
substantially affect dialysis professionals' ability to bring many more patients
into their care, since there is an even larger population of renal failure, non-
dialyzed patients waiting for dialysis. It is likely that dialysis stations can be
kept full.'0 To make the argument that there is a cartel operating to create
a monopoly, reducing competition and industry output, is both to misunderstand
the nature of the transplant enterprise, and to succumb to imagery awash in
cynicism. Consider, for example, the heart transplant professional culture. While
there may be a large number of heart transplant programs performing few heart
transplants, this statistic is not necessarily related to the direct financial value
the programs create for a transplant enterprise. More likely, additional heart
transplant programs are created for the prestige and marketing benefits to other
cardiac programs within an institution.
Blair and Kaserman contend that OPOs benefit from a low number of
donors because they enjoy a monopoly in the field. There are however, other,
more benign interpretations for OPOs' spotty performance records. Perhaps,
if they are not doing their jobs well, it is because they are underfunded or their
personnel undertrained. Inadequate education and implementation of donor
9. Guttmann, Facing Organ Allocation Issues: An Insider's View From the New World, in ETHICS,
JUSTICE AND COMMERCE IN ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY 412-20 (W. Land & J.B. Dossetor eds.).
10. We should also not forget that thousands of patients are awaiting other types of vital organs and
do not have alternative therapy choices. Because these transplant programs are not competing with other
forms of chronic therapy, the gates to access are not yet established and are likely to be defined differently.
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identification protocols by OPOs within hospitals may result in the significant
problem of failure to ask for consent." An analysis that focuses on monopo-
listic design in the altruistic system may underestimate the importance of these
practical factors in the day-to-day operating of the OPOs.
The authors also contend that a market system will be less susceptible than
an altruistic system to black market problems. They argue that having no price
on organs under the current altruistic system results in an undersupply. The
system thus potentially creates a black market or influences the inclination of
patients to make "donations" to transplant centers in order to jump the queue.
Most concerned professionals abhor the isolated incidents of this manipulative
behavior. However, the creation of a legitimate market will not eliminate the
possibility for, or the troubling qualities of, such transactions, but will only
change the locus of system manipulation.
IV. Commodifying Consent
Blair and Kaserman discount the ugliness of a system that has brokers and
agents of patients, and the problems that could arise when living donors bid
for organs or futures contracts for organs. The market system is intended to
recruit future organ donors as well as to compensate families of uncommitted
potential brain-death donors. The belief is that this system will not interfere
with the situation of becoming a donor, will not affect the determination of
irreversible brain damage, and will theoretically initiate more easily the complex
process of donor identification.
The market proposal, then, really shifts the initiating cause of the process
from the family or attending physician, in the altruistic instance, to the market
system itself. But initiation by the market is little different from initiation by
an uncompensated voluntarily signed living will, except that there is a greater
likelihood that a living will, currently untracked, could go unnoticed (or disre-
garded if in conflict with next-of-kin attitudes). Where there is no prior consent,
market forces may create added incentives for third party procurement, but
ultimately the scenario would be the same as under the altruistic system,
because procurement will still require next-of-kin consent in an environment
of familial grief.
The market system relies on monetary payment to obtain consent in these
situations. However, offers of payment may offend and can change attitudes
about consent. The delicacy of attitudes is illustrated by a recent report from
Argentina. There, the number of donor referrals to their OPOs fell dramatically
when the media provided unsubstantiated reports that children were being
11. Robertson, supra note 3, at 77-87.
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abducted for the purpose of obtaining organs, some said to return with a "little
scar in the loin," implying that a kidney had been removed. 2
The focal points of consent are not different under the two systems, but
what is essentially different will upset many. The act of donation, rather than
the organ, is commodified. While cultures and individuals differ in their view
of the reification of altruistic acts, the psychological benefits derived from the
act of consent for organ donation ought not be thought valueless. Thus the
"zero" price is used in a distorted way to bolster a narrow economic argument
about a matter that has many other dimensions. In fact, public attitudes do not
appear to support a system change. 3
V. Logistical Questions
The authors leave open many important questions about how their proposed
system would work logistically. What are the contracting-in and contracting-out
mechanisms, the identification and tracking mechanisms, and the default
mechanisms for organ donors? Since promises of future delivery would be sold
and could be rebought, could there be trading in the system such that someone
could sell when the market was thin and command a price greater than that
when the market was more liquid, thus deriving a profit from entering and
exiting before death? Could one do this multiple times? That is to say, could
one become a trader of consent contracts of one's vital organs? Could deriva-
tive instruments, such as rights on these contracts, be developed? What about
contract cancellation? Could the mechanics of family meandering possibly tie
up the proceedings for long a enough time such that the organs would not be
usable?
The functioning of the system would also depend upon the answers to
empirical questions. If such a market system were introduced, how long might
it take for current contract sellers to arrive at the donor state? Are there
estimates of the cost of establishing and implementing such a system?
Other interesting questions arise when considering the futures contract,
which is a market instrument suggested by other commentators. Is it for all the
organs or can one sell a contract on kidneys and liver, for example, but not
heart, lungs and pancreas? If, during the life of the contractor, a disease
develops which makes one or more but not all organs unusable, is repayment
required for the inability to provide a specific organ? If not, would purchasers
be allowed to create contractual obligations on the part of the future donor to
12. See Cantarovich, Sectarianism, Uncertainty and Fear: Mechanisms that may Reverse Attitudes
Toward Organ Donation, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1409-10 (1989).
13. See Manninen & Evans, Public Attitude and Behavior Regarding Organ Donation, 253 J. Am. MED.
A. 3111-15 (1985); Prottas, Encouraging Altruism: Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Organ
Donation, 61 MILLBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q./HEALTH AND SOCIETY 278-306 (1983).
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refrain from activities that likely damage the organs?, In contrast, in the
altruistic system, the living will signer is not tracked, and dealt with at virtually
no cost at the time of actual donation.
Whether compensation for future donation would be acceptable to the public
and consequently result in more sign-ups and more donors needs to be further
explored. The vast majority of individuals will never need a transplant, nor will
be medically definable as an organ donor. Determining attitudes towards the
consent act needs to and can be determined. Perhaps in the process, we will
discover why the altruism and "gift of life" metaphors have been so strong.
While these needs for information should not. deter the theoretical consider-
ations of the proposal or the merits of arguments for or against compensation,
one ultimately must deal in specifics as well as theory if we are to take the
proposal seriously.
Conclusion
For those of us engaged in the field of organ transplantation, patients are
constant reminders of the donor shortage. We have long waiting lists of those
who need hearts, lungs and livers. These patients will die in an extraordinarily
unpleasant manner unless a vital organ for transplantation is obtained. The
situation is somewhat less dramatic for the thousands of patients with kidney
failure. The alternative treatment by dialysis allows a reasonable rehabilitation
and quality of life for those who have not yet been allocated a kidney or for
those who choose not to have a kidney transplant.
Waiting lists demonstrate the oppressive reality of the donor shortage
problem. Many more patients are awaiting transplants than there are organs
available. There is a strong belief that there are many more usable organs not
being obtained, and a strong desire to improve and make substantial changes
in the current system. I have argued that the strength of these desires has not
yet been met by equally strong arguments for switching from an altruistic to
a market system.
The proposal to change from altruistic consent for organ donation to a
market-based valuation system represents a radical departure that offers only
thin assurances of improvement. It is radical since it exchanges important
symbols-we are being asked to reify and to sell consent, an act not previously
considered a commodity. The altruistic act of consent for donation exists in the
context of a complex medical field. Transplantation, with all of its life-prolong-
ing and dramatic aspects, consumes considerable resources per individual
treated and treads on the culturally sensitive ground of beliefs about body and
death.
Switching to a market system offers little hope of mitigating the difficulties
of the process. The risk that a mercantile transaction will further dehumanize
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 8: 453, 1991
the event, whether action was taken in the past or consent obtained in the
present, is a subject that deserves reflection. The contention that the futures and
spot market contract for the consent act will produce more donor organs should
not be thought resolved until more essential information is elaborated through
a proper research agenda. Questions pertaining to allocation, or the demand side
of the equation, need be addressed for any theory of an organ donor market to
be fully realizable.
Until it can address these problematic areas, Blair and Kaserman's proposal
for a cadaveric organ market, helpful though it may be in advancing debate,
remains in the realm of an interesting one-dimensional speculation. The realities
with which the market system would have to contend may overwhelm the
benefits identified by its proponents.
